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5. Antiscepticism and easy justification
 
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter I investigate the epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based 
justification is elusive, in the sense that the subject can lose it simply by reflecting on her seemings. 
I argue that since seeming-based justification is elusive, the antisceptical bite of phenomenal 
conservatism is importantly limited. I also contend that since seeming-based justification has this 
feature, phenomenal conservatism isn’t actually afflicted by easy justification problems.  
5.2 Antiscepticism and reflective awareness
Suppose P is the content of a possible appearance of S. A sceptical alternative SH or sceptical 
scenario SH alternative to P is a special error conjecture SH such that, if SH is true, (i) P is false 
though S has an appearance that P, and (ii) S couldn’t discover that SH is true, no matter how much 
or how deep S might investigate. As we have seen in §2.4, one of the asserted merits of phenomenal
conservatism is that it affords us the means of a thoroughgoing response to the sceptic –– in 
particular, the sceptic who insists that S must have independent justification for ruling out any 
relevant sceptical alternative in order to possess justification for believing ordinary things. For 
instance, suppose that S has a perceptual appearance that (P) there is a cat on the mat, and no reason
to think that this appearance could be deceptive. The sceptic could argue that since it might be the 
case that, say, (SH) P is false and S has a hallucination that P caused by the Matrix, S has 
justification for believing P only if S has independent justification for ruling out SH. The sceptic 
will insist that since S cannot have this independent justification, S doesn’t have justification for 
believing P. Antisceptics can attempt various lines of reply. The phenomenal conservative would 
respond that since (PC) is true and S has an appearance that P, S does have prima facie justification 
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for believing P even if S has no independent justification for believing ¬SH.1 The phenomenal
conservative will conclude that since S has no reason to think that her appearance might be 
deceptive in the case in point, S does have justification for believing P. Although this line of 
response may appear very promising or even successful, it isn’t free from problems.
I will now make a case to the effect that the antisceptical bite of (PC) is importantly limited. 
A response to the sceptic would actually be forceful only if –– I suggest –– it enabled a thinker S 
who engaged with a sceptical argument that questioned her own possession of epistemic 
justification (or knowledge) to reject or seriously challenge the argument. A paradigmatic example 
of such a thinker is Descartes in his Meditations. It appears to me, however, that (PC) doesn’t allow 
for this type of response to the sceptic. As we have seen in §4.4, seeming-based justification is 
elusive.2 For S can lose her seeming-based justification for believing a proposition P by simply 
reflecting on her mental states and thereby acquiring a belief that she has a seeming that P. In these 
circumstances, S’s seeming-based justification for P would in fact be overridden and thus replaced 
by S’s reflective justification for P (the one based on S’s reflective beliefs that she has a seeming 
that P), where the latter justification may be very different in strength from the former. I will now 
show that since seeming-based justification is elusive in this sense, if S attempted to reject a 
sceptical argument that questioned her own possession of seeming-based justification by adducing 
(PC) in discussion or private reasoning, S would lose her seeming-based justification, making her 
appeal to (PC) ineffective.
Imagine S has an appearance that (P) that there is an apple on the table, and no reason to 
think it might be deceptive. Suppose that at a certain point S engages with a sceptical argument that 
questions the claim that S has actually justification for believing P. The argument states –– precisely
1 I take the expression ‘ruling out SH’ to mean ‘believing ¬SH’.
2 I use the term ‘elusive’ in a sense similar to one used Lewis (1996) to describe that which he thought was an 
important feature of knowledge. This similarity doesn’t commit me to endorsing Lewis’ views.
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–– that since S’s appearance P can possibly be caused by the instantiation of a sceptical
alternative SH to P, S could have justification for believing P only if she had independent 
justification for believing ¬SH. (Suppose SH states that while P is false, S has a hallucination that P
caused by an evil demon.) The argument concludes that since S doesn’t have this independent 
justification, S doesn’t possess justification for believing P. This sceptical argument is just one of 
those that (PC) is claimed to enable us to defuse. The question is –– therefore –– whether, in the 
imagined circumstances, S can respond successfully to this argument by adducing (PC) and 
contending that she does have justification for believing P. Unfortunately for the phenomenal 
conservative, the answer is negative.
Consider that S can actually engage with the sceptical argument under consideration only if 
she grasps the way in which SH puts her justification for P at risk. S can do this only if S becomes 
reflectively aware of her seeming that P. Furthermore, note that S can competently adduce (PC) to 
respond to the sceptic only if she is reflectively aware of her seeming that P. For this seeming is 
referred to in the relevant instance of (PC) that S is committed to invoking. If S becomes reflectively
aware of her seeming that P, however, even if (PC) holds true, S’s seeming-based justification for P
will be overridden by S’s reflective justification for P based on S’s reflective belief that she has a 
seeming that P. Thus, at this point, whether or not S has justification for believing P no longer 
depends on S’s having seeming-based justification, and so it doesn’t hinge on (PC)’s truth. Whether
or not S has justification for believing P depends on S’s having reflective justification, which is not 
accounted for by (PC). That’s why S couldn’t reject the sceptical argument by appealing to (PC).
In response, phenomenal conservatives might try to deny the general thesis that reflective 
justification overrides the correlated seeming-based justification. A basic problem of such a strategy
is that the thesis appears true in the circumstances we have envisaged. Suppose that at a time t0, S 
has a seeming that P and no reason to think that it might be deceptive. In these circumstances, S’s 
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seeming that P gives S justification for believing P. Suppose that at a successive time t1, S
engages with the sceptical argument that questions her having justification for P. Accordingly, S 
becomes reflectively aware of her seeming that P. At t0, S didn’t have the belief that she had that 
seeming. S was thus unable to wonder whether her seeming was veridical or deceptive. At t1, S is 
able to pose this question and, pressed by the sceptical case, she actually does so. S finds two 
possible answers. A first hypothesis available to S –– the perception hypothesis –– states that S 
actually perceives that P. The sceptical argument offers S an alternative hypothesis SH, which states
that P is false and S has a hallucination that P. It is intuitive that in this predicament, S’s seeming 
that P can no longer give S justification for believing P. Suppose in fact that, at t1, S’s seeming that 
P gave S justification for believing P. Since, at t1, S reflectively believes that she has that seeming, 
S would thereby acquire justification for believing that the seeming that she has is veridical –– 
namely, for believing the perception hypothesis and ruling out SH. But this looks perversely 
circular: no seeming of S could per se provide S with (even some degree of) justification for 
believing that the seeming itself is veridical. Justification for believing so requires independent 
evidence. Hence, it appears very plausible that, at t1, S’s seeming that P can no longer give S 
justification for believing P.3 (I return to these issues in §5.4.)
At t1, S could have some justification for believing P if S were able to conclude that the 
perception hypothesis is likely to be the correct explanation of her seeming’s existence. S would get
justification for this conclusion through an inference to the probable explanation of her seeming’s 
existence. Inferences don’t link seemings with doxastic states, they connect premises with 
conclusions –– namely, doxastic states with other doxastic states. The inference by S would go from
her reflective belief that she has a seeming that P to her belief that the perception hypothesis has a 
3 One might alternatively attempt to stop the vicious circularity by conceding that S’s seeming that P gives S 
justification for P while insisting that S’s reflective acquaintance with her seeming doesn’t give S justification for 
believing that she has that seeming. But the last claim is very counterintuitive.  
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good chance to be true. At t1, S could possibly acquire justification for P via an inference like
this. These considerations strongly suggest that, at t1, it is S’s reflective belief that she has a seeming
that P –– rather than S’s seeming itself –– that provides the basis of S’s justification for P.4 At t1, S’s
seeming that P only plays an indirect role: S’s acquaintance with this seeming forms the basis of the
justification of the premise of S’s inference –– S’s reflective belief that she has a seeming that P. In 
conclusion, at t1, S’s seeming-based justification for P appears to be overridden by S’s reflective 
justification for P. This is why S couldn’t reject the sceptical argument by appealing to (PC).
A question naturally arising at this point is whether S would actually be able to acquire 
enough justification to believe P once she has engaged with the sceptical argument. I cannot hope to
settle this important question here. Let me make only one remark. We should concede to the sceptic
that S could have justification sufficient to believe P, in this case, only if S had higher independent 
justification for believing ¬SH. This is so because in the imagined circumstances, S’s reflective 
justification for P would override S’s seeming-based justification for P and –– as we have seen in 
§4.4 –– the strength of S’s reflective justification has an upper bound in the strength of S’s 
independent justification for believing that any relevant error conjecture is false; so, also for 
believing ¬SH.
4 This discussion naturally suggests a view about epistemic justification that parallels Sosa’s celebrated thesis there are 
two different kinds of knowledge. According to Sosa, 
One has animal knowledge about one’s environment, one’s past, and one’s own experience if one’s judgments 
and beliefs about these are direct responses to their impact –– e.g., through perception or memory –– with little 
or no benefit of reflection or understanding… [Furthermore,] one has reflective knowledge if one’s judgment or
belief manifests not only such direct response to the fact known but also understanding of its place in a wider 
whole that includes one’s belief and knowledge of it and how these come about. (1991: 240). 
Animal knowledge is mere reactive knowledge, whereas reflective knowledge is mainly unifying or integrating 
knowledge. One could similarly distinguish between animal justification and reflective justification. S’s animal 
justification for believing Q is identifiable with S’s justification for Q based on her seeming that Q. Animal justification 
has essentially the function of certifying the rationality of S’s reactive beliefs –– those directly caused by S’s 
appearances. S’s reflective justification for believing Q is instead justification based on S’s belief that she has an 
appearance that Q. Justification of this type stems from S’s ability to explain her appearance that Q by adducing Q in 
conjunction with other propositions about her environment and cognitive faculties. Reflective justification has the 
function of certifying the rationality of the beliefs of S that aim at a unified and integrated view of the world. 
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One might suggest that, thanks to (PC), this condition necessary for S’s having enough
reflective justification for believing P is satisfied as long as SH refers to a sceptical conjecture 
(rather than an ordinary error conjecture). The suggestion precisely says that since SH is a terribly 
far-fetched, odd and unnatural proposition as only sceptical scenarios can be, if S were going to 
appraise SH, S would normally have a seeming that ¬SH. And this seeming would grant S enough 
prima facie justification to believe ¬SH. Note that if this is true, our seemings can provide us with 
immediate justification for ruling out sceptical conjectures.
Since I have actually heard this suggestion a few times in conversation, let me briefly 
examine it. My view is that the suggestion faces a series of hurdles, and ultimately fails. To begin 
with, note that if S had a seeming that ¬SH, the conclusion licensed by (PC) would be that S has 
prima facie justification sufficient to believe ¬SH. However, we have seen that S could have 
reflective justification sufficient to believe P only if she had higher justification for believing ¬SH. 
Thus, even if S had a seeming that ¬SH, it is unclear that the condition necessary for S’s having 
enough reflective justification to believe P would be met. The argument under consideration seems 
to rely on a principle of seeming-based justification stronger than (PC), which should be clarified 
and defended. Another concern –– which I have articulated in Moretti (2019) –– is that S’s 
justification based on a seeming that ¬SH would be elusive in the same way as S’s seeming-based 
justification for P is elusive. S would lose her seeming-based justification for ¬SH if she engaged 
with a sceptical argument that questioned her possession of it.
There are more serious problems: under closer scrutiny, it is quite dubious that if S inspected
¬SH, S would actually have a seeming that ¬SH, or seeming-based justification sufficient to believe
¬SH. To begin with, note that a seeming that ¬SH would not need to come with sensory or mental 
images of any type –– it would be qualia-free. It would thus closely resemble a rational (or a 
priori) appearance, such as an appearance that 1 = 1. A seeming that ¬SH couldn’t however qualify 
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as a rational seeming, for rational seemings are about necessary truths, and ¬SH doesn’t look
like a necessary truth. This might raise some initial concern about the claim that S can have a 
seeming that ¬SH. Nevertheless, some authors think that people can entertain qualia-free seemings 
that are not rational seemings. This could happen, for instance, in attested cases of blindsight. 
According to these authors, in these cases, self-avowed blind or partly blind subjects have accurate 
seemings about objects present in their environment, although they have no visual sensation (cf. 
Tucker 2010 and Huemer 2013). Since the content of a qualia-free seeming of this type would be a 
contingent proposition, one can insist that there is no principled problem with the claim that S can 
entertain a qualia-free seeming that ¬SH, though ¬SH is contingent.
Even so, the claim is questionable. A seeming that ¬SH can be free from non-cognitive 
qualia (e.g. colours, flavours, smells, sounds, and so on) but it cannot be completely free from 
cognitive qualia. Phenomenal conservatives admit of at least one cognitive quale: the phenomenal 
force of appearances (described in §2.3). Because of its phenomenal force, a seeming that ¬SH is 
supposed to be an experience of verifying or ascertaining that ¬SH. However, when one inspects a 
proposition like ¬SH, admittedly, one normally has no experience of this sort. So, again, it looks 
dubious that S can have a seeming that ¬SH.
To respond, one could suggest that seemings can actually be stronger or weaker because 
their phenomenal force is not just a matter of all or nothing but, rather, it comes in degrees (cf. 
Huemer 2005: 100 and Koksvik 2011: 127). One could then insist that a seeming that ¬SH would 
just be a weak seeming. This would explain why when we inspect a proposition like ¬SH, we don’t 
have the feeling of verifying that ¬SH. Suppose this is correct. If S’s seeming that ¬SH were a 
weak seeming, presumably, it would provide S only with weak justification for ¬SH.5 Therefore, S 
5 The weak version (pc) of (PC), presented in §2.2, can account for weak seeming-based justification of this type.
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would not have justification sufficient to believe ¬SH. So, S could not have reflective
justification sufficient to believe P. In conclusion, this rejoinder doesn’t help.
The only alternative reply I can think of draws on Huemer (2016)’s theory of inferential 
seemings, which expands phenomenal conservatism to deliver an account of inferential 
justification. According to Huemer’s theory, S’s having inferential justification for Q from P 
requires –– among other things –– S’s having justification for believing P, and S’s entertaining an 
inferential seeming that represents Q as likely in light of P,6 where the likelihood can be relative to 
S’s background information B. In particular, S’s inferential seeming would include reference to B if 
S’s sense of likelihood constituting the seeming were generated by mental processes of S shaped by 
B, and if S would be disposed to acknowledge, if the issue arose, the relevance of B to the likelihood
of Q. Huemer suggests that a limiting case of S’s having inferential justification for Q is one in 
which only B, but no premise P, is involved in the justification for Q. Here is an example:  
When the issue arises as to what country I occupy, it seems to me very likely (to put it 
mildly) that I live in the United States. This sense of likelihood is shaped by a host of past 
experiences and beliefs of mine that are relevant to where I live, including many 
experiences and beliefs that I do not now remember. That is part of why my sense of 
likelihood counts as referring to the probability of my living in the United States 
conditional on all those past experiences and beliefs. But... it is also a matter of how I would
react if some of these past experiences or beliefs were raised in connection with the question
of how likely it is that I live in the United States. For example, if the question arises, I will 
view the fact that Colorado is in the United States (which I believe) as supporting the claim 
that I “probably” live in the United States. (2016: 158).
6 When P just entails Q, the seeming represents Q as maximally likely in light of P.
9One could contend that S’s seeming that ¬SH would actually be an appearance of this type. If this is
correct, the seeming would be –– precisely –– an appearance that ¬SH is likely. This would clarify 
why S would not have the feeling of verifying that ¬SH.
However, also this rejoinder is problematic. S’s seeming that ¬SH is likely could supply S 
with justification sufficient to believe that ¬SH is likely. It is unclear, however, that a seeming of 
this sort could give S justification sufficient or even more than sufficient to believe ¬SH. One might
however suppose that if ¬SH appeared extremely likely to S, S might get justification sufficient or 
even more than sufficient to believe ¬SH. So, the question is whether or not ¬SH would appear to S
to be extremely likely. According to Huemer’s theory, how likely ¬SH would appear to S to be is 
determined by the content of ¬SH and background information B. Suppose for example S has a firm
background belief that (ND) demons don’t exist. If SH stated that S is deceived by a demon into 
experiencing as if P, S might in these circumstances have a seeming that ¬SH is extremely likely. 
This won’t always be the case, though. Suppose S believes ND but SH states that S is hallucinated 
by the Matrix. Or suppose SH states that S is hallucinated by a demon but S doesn’t believe ND. In 
either case, S may not have a seeming that ¬SH is extremely likely. Indeed, there is no guarantee 
that S would have a seeming that ¬SH is extremely likely. Whether or not S would have such a 
seeming depends on the specific contents of SH and B.
It is also important to note that if SH were a global sceptical conjecture, S’s conceiving of 
SH could result in altering the content of B, which could preclude S from having a seeming that 
¬SH is likely. Suppose for example that SH states that S is a disembodied soul in an immaterial 
world deceived by an evil demon into perceiving the ordinary world. Imagine that S initially 
believes ND (demons don’t exist) on the grounds of evidence coming from her science readings. S’s
conceiving of SH could lead S to doubt that she actually has evidence for ND, thus to doubt ND. 
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Because of this, S may become unable to entertain a seeming that ¬SH is likely. To conclude,
even if Huemer’s theory of inferential seemings were correct, there would no guarantee that, upon 
inspecting SH, S would have seeming-based justification sufficient on more than sufficient to 
believe ¬SH.
In summary, we have seen that the antisceptical bite of (PC) is importantly limited because 
S couldn’t successfully appeal to (PC) to rebut a sceptical argument that questioned her own 
possession of appearance-based justification for a proposition P. The problem is that as S engaged 
with the argument or competently invoked (PC), her seeming-based justification for P would be 
replaced by reflective justification for P, which may not suffice to sustain S’s belief that P. We have
also seen that the truth (PC) cannot guarantee the fulfilment of a condition necessary to make S’s 
reflective justification robust enough to sustain S’s belief that P.       
5.3 Easy justification objections
In the former section I have argued that the fact that seeming-based justification is elusive (in the 
sense explained) has a negative impact on phenomenal conservatism, as it weakens its antisceptical 
bite. Allow me now to show that the very same fact also has a positive consequence for phenomenal
conservatism, as it offers its supporters the means to reject two apparently forceful objections 
against it. In this section I present these objections. My cases against them will follow in the next 
two sections.
Consider a subject S, an evidence source ES (such as perception, memory, induction, etc.) 
and a proposition P. Suppose ES provides S with evidence that P. Any view W (internalist or 
externalist) that allows S to know that P on the basis of ES regardless of S’s having independent 
knowledge that ES is reliable is called by Cohen a basic knowledge theory. Cohen (2002, 2005) 
contends that any basic knowledge theory W is affected by easy knowledge problems. In particular, 
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on W, it will prove too easy for S to know that ES is reliable, which suggests that W is flawed.
Cohen’s arguments often range from focusing on knowledge to focusing on epistemic justification. 
The problems of easy knowledge can indeed be reformulated in terms of easy justification. Let’s 
call basic justification theory any view W (internalist or externalist) that allows S to acquire 
justification for believing P through ES regardless of S’s having independent justification for 
believing that ES is reliable. According to Cohen any basic justification theory W is plagued by 
easy justification problems. In particular, on W, it will prove excessively easy for S to acquire 
justification for believing that ES is reliable, which suggests that W is flawed.
Suppose again that ES provides S with evidence that P. There are various ways to interpret 
the claim that ES is reliable. Let’s consider two of them. That claim can be read as stating that ES is
reliable in this particular case –– meaning that S’s evidence that P is not deceptive –– or it can be 
interpreted as stating that ES is reliable in general –– meaning that the propositions which ES 
supplies (good) evidence for are true most of the time. When Cohen speaks of the reliability of ES, 
he means the reliability of ES in general.7 In my discussion, I will also refer to the notion of 
reliability in a particular case. For it appears to me that the two principal varieties of easy 
justification problems described by Cohen actually arise from interpreting ‘reliability’ in these two 
respective senses. (I give examples below.) Hereafter, I will focus on justification.
Cohen (2002, 2005) maintains that phenomenal conservatism is plagued by easy 
justification problems –– this is indeed a recurrent criticism of phenomenal conservatism. See for 
example White (2006), Wright (2007), and Siegel and Silins (2015).8  In fact note that (PC) qualifies
as a basic justification theory, as it allows S to have justification for P from a seeming that P 
regardless of S’s having independent justification for believing that the seeming is reliable, and 
7 See especially Cohen (2005).
8 These authors focus on perceptual dogmatism, but their objections can be extended to hit more generally phenomenal 
conservatism.
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irrespective of S’s having independent justification for believing that the seemings of the same
type are accurate most of the time. Epistemologists formulate the easy justification problems as 
objections that target theories of basic justification –– precisely, as the easy justification from 
closure objection and the easy justification from bootstrapping objection. Let’s see how these 
objections can be used to strike phenomenal conservatism.
The easy justification from closure objection interprets ‘reliable’ as ‘reliable in a particular 
case’ and exploits the principle of closure of justification under known entailment, according to 
which:
(JC) If S has justification sufficient to believe P and S knows that P entails Q, then S has 
justification sufficient to believe Q. 
(JC) or a very similar principle is pervasively used in science and ordinary epistemic practices to 
expand the set of one’s justified beliefs via deduction. (JC) looks very plausible and most 
epistemologists endorse it.  
This is how the objection unfolds (cf. Cohen 2002). Consider a proposition R and a 
correlated error conjecture SH. Suppose for instance that:
R = ‘the table is red’;
SH = ‘the table is white but seems red because it is illuminated by a hidden red light’.
Imagine S has an appearance that R and no reason to suspect that the appearance is deceptive. If 
(PC) is correct, S will acquire justification sufficient to believe R. Since S knows that R entails ¬SH,
thanks to (JC), S will also acquire enough justification to believe ¬SH. Indeed, since SH can be 
replaced by any alternative error conjecture S might think of, S will get justification sufficient to 
believe –– more generally –– that her seeming is reliable. However, acquiring justification in this 
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way appears really too easy. If one could rationally exclude all relevant error possibilities in this
rather simple way, one would never rely on inductive justification from past cases to dispel 
sceptical concerns,9 and one would never perform independent checks.10 However, as a matter of 
fact, people do rely on inductive justification from past cases and they often perform independent 
checks to exclude possible mistakes (cf. Cohen 2002: 313). There is a more fundamental reason 
why such a way to get justification looks counterintuitive: saying that S can rationally rule out 
possible cognitive errors in the way described is substantially the same as saying that a seeming of 
S on its own and without the help of independent evidence can give S justification for believing that 
the seeming itself is not deceptive. This appears hopelessly circular (cf. Siegel and Silins 2015: 
787). In conclusion, since (JC) and (PC) jointly sanction this intuitively flawed way to acquire 
justification for rejecting error conjectures, but (JC) is intuitively very plausible, (PC) must be 
flawed. It is important to note that a principle alternative to (PC) which permitted S to acquire 
justification from a seeming only if S had independent justification for believing that the seeming is 
reliable would not raise the easy justification problem just described. On this alternative principle, 
in order to receive justification from a seeming, S should already have justification for ruling out 
the relevant error conjectures. Therefore, S would not acquire this justification from her seeming.11
Let’s turn to the bootstrapping objection. A version of this argument was initially raised by 
Fumerton (1995) and Vogel (2000) against reliabilism about justification, but it became soon clear 
that internalist theories of basic justification can also be targeted by it. This objection interprets 
‘reliable’ as ‘generally reliable’ and makes use of both deductive and ampliative inferences. 
Furthermore, also this objection relies on thought experiments. Cohen (2010) for example imagines 
9 For example, to try to rule out SH, S could consider how many times in the past she was actually tricked into believing
that an object had a certain colour by a hidden light shining on it. 
10 For instance, to rule out SH, S could carefully check all light sources above the table.
11 This would instantiate a case of failure of transmission of justification (see for instance Wright 2002 and Moretti and
Piazza 2018).  
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a scenario like this: suppose that, having no idea whether her colour vision is reliable, S decides
to test it. A friend stands above S and holds up many coloured cards, one at a time. S looks at the 
first card and reason:
(1) The first card appears red to me.
(2) The first card is red.
(3) The first card is red and appears red to me.
(4) Therefore, my colour appearance matches the actual colour of the card on this occasion.
Suppose (PC) is true. Since S bases her belief (2) on her seeming that the card is red, and she has no
reason to suspect that the seeming is deceptive, (2) is justified for S. Since S bases her belief (1) on 
her reflective acquaintance with that seeming, (1) is also justified for S. Furthermore, (3) is justified 
for S because she deduces it from (1) and (2); and (4) is justified for S because she deduces it from 
(3). Imagine now that S reasons exactly the same way for each of n cards held up by her friend: the 
second card is blue, it appears blue to me, so the second card is blue and appears blue to me, etc. 
Eventually, S will deductively infer:
(5) My colour experiences have always matched the actual colour of each of the n cards 
that I have viewed.
Since the premises of (5) are all justified for S, (5) is also justified for her. Imagine that S finally 
infers from (5) by enumerative induction (cf. Cohen 2005) or inference to the best explanation (cf. 
White 2006):
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(6) My colour vision is reliable.
Provided that the number n of cards viewed by S is sufficiently large, S will justifiedly believe (6).
The problem is –– again –– that acquiring justification for believing that an evidence source 
is reliable in this way looks far too easy. It is intuitively implausible that S could arrive at justifying 
the claim that her colour appearances are generally reliable by relying only on her colour 
appearances, and without any independent verification of their accuracy. Since the deductive and 
inductive steps of this procedure appear straightforward, and it is very plausible that S does have 
justification for (1) by reflective acquaintance with her seeming, the problem must lie in (2). We 
should conclude, therefore, that S cannot have justification for believing (2) on the basis of her 
seeming in these circumstances. This is possible only if (PC) is incorrect. So (PC) must be 
incorrect. It is important to note that a principle alternative to (PC) which permitted S to acquire 
justification from an appearance only if S had independent justification for believing that the 
appearances of the same type are reliable would not raise this easy justification problem.12 For if S 
could acquire justification for (2) only if S had already justification for believing that (6), S 
wouldn’t acquire this justification for (6) through the inferential steps described above.
5.4 Answering the easy justification from closure objection
As Siegel and Silins (2015) suggest, to respond to the easy justification from closure objection, 
phenomenal conservatives might be tempted to reject the closure principle (JC) and contend that 
justification need not transmit across deductive arguments like the one from R to ¬SH.13 A problem 
12 Weisberg (2010) nevertheless contends, against Cohen, that also non-basic justification theories of this type are 
affected by a variant of the bootstrapping problem, so this problem is actually a paradox rather than an objection to 
specific epistemological views like phenomenal conservatism or reliabilism. See Cohen (2010) for a response. 
13 An attempt in this direction is in Cohen (2002). For views that reject (JC) independent of the easy justification 
problem see for instance Dretske (1970) and Avnur (2012).
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of this strategy is that even if (JC) turned out not to be true across the board, (JC) appears true
when applied to ordinary propositions like R and ¬SH. (Recall that R states that table is red, and SH
states that the table is white but seems red because it is illuminated by a hidden red light.) So, this 
line of reply doesn’t look promising. Let me discuss an alternative and influential response, worked 
out independently by Pryor (2004) and Markie (2005), which doesn’t involve rejecting (JC). My 
own response will emerge from the criticism of this response.
Pryor and Markie admit that when we inspect arguments like the one from R to ¬SH, 
licensed (PC), we have the impression that they are in some sense defective. According to them, 
however, our feeling doesn’t stem from our perceiving that these arguments cannot actually 
transmit justification to their conclusions;14 it rather originates from our sensing that these 
arguments have no dialectical power, so they are of limited use. Pryor and Markie insist that since 
arguments of this type are epistemically impeccable, there is no reason to think that (PC) and 
similar principles of immediate justification are flawed or problematic.
To understand Pryor and Markie’s contention, consider the following scenario, used by 
Cohen (2002) to introduce the easy knowledge from closure objection:
Suppose my son wants to buy a red table for his room. We go in the store and I say, ‘That 
table is red. I'll buy it for you.’... [He] worries, ‘Daddy, what if it’s white with red lights 
shining on it?’ I reply, ‘Don’t worry –– you see, it looks red, so it is red, so it’s not white but
illuminated by red lights.’ Surely, he should not be satisfied with this response. (314)
According to Pryor and Markie, what actually explains the impression that the boy wouldn’t be 
rationally persuaded by his father to believe ¬SH in this scenario is our sensing that the argument 
14 Markie focuses on knowledge rather than justification, but his claims can be recast in terms of justification.
17
from R to ¬SH, adduced by the father, is dialectically ineffective. Any dialectically ineffective
argument is such that it is unable to persuade an interlocutor of the truth of its conclusion if the 
interlocutor doubts the conclusion beforehand. For the subject who does so is rationally committed 
to not accepting the evidence offered in support of the premise as a justification for believing it.15 
The argument from R to ¬SH appears to have this problematic feature. Since the boy doubts ¬SH 
(he doubts whether or not the table is white but seems red as deceptively illuminated), he cannot 
accept his own appearance that R (that the table is red) –– referred to in his father’s case –– as a 
justification for R. So, he couldn’t rationally believe ¬SH in virtue of his father’s argument.16
Pryor and Markie think that despite this argument is dialectically powerless, the boy does 
acquire justification for believing ¬SH thanks to the argument. For he has a seeming that R and no 
defeating evidence. So, the boy must have justification for believing R,17 and he must also have 
justification for believing ¬SH when he appreciates that R entails ¬SH (cf. Pryor 2004: 362-368). A
very similar diagnosis can be produced –– according to Prior and Markie –– for all deductive 
arguments sanctioned by (PC) and similar principles of immediate justification that seem to enable 
us to rule our error conjecture too easily. These arguments are in fact all epistemically faultless, 
though dialectically ineffective. 
In order to assess Pryor and Markie’s claims, it is instructive to examine Cohen (2005)’s 
rejoinder. Cohen concedes that a diagnosis like the one detailed above can partly explain the feeling
that arguments such as the one from R to ¬SH are defective, but he contends that it cannot provide 
the full explanation. For arguments like these –– according to him –– are both dialectically 
ineffective and epistemically flawed. To support his view, Cohen produces a variant of the scenario 
15 I follow Pryor (2004)’s account, as it is much more detailed than Markie (2006)’s. 
16 As clarified in §2.4, rational commitment is a type of coherence between propositional attitudes that doesn’t require 
them to be justified. So, even if the boy’s doubt that ¬SH is suppositional or hypothetical and so unjustified, this 
attitude still rationally commits him to not accepting his seeming that R as a justification for R.
17 This is meant to be propositional justification. If the boy actually believed R, his belief would be irrational and so 
doxastically unjustified.
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described before. In this variant, his son no longer doubts ¬SH. He accepts that his father knows
that ¬SH, and asks him why it is the case that ¬SH. The father answers in the same way as before: 
‘Oh, that’s easy. [The table] looks red, so it is red, so it is not white with red lights shining on it.’ 
(2004: 420). Cohen emphasizes that it is still intuitive that his son would find the argument 
unconvincing. He observes that since the boy no longer doubts ¬SH, we couldn’t explain this 
intuition by claiming that the argument is dialectically ineffective. According to Cohen, this 
example strongly suggests that the weakness of arguments like the one from R to ¬SH, authorized 
by (PC), is also epistemic, not just dialectical. Although Cohen apparently scores points against 
Pryor and Markie in this case, I believe that these two authors are ultimately correct when they 
claim that the arguments like the one from R to ¬SH, authorized by (PC), are epistemically 
impeccable.
A source of confusion that permeates through this dispute is the fact that neither Pryor and 
Markie nor Cohen distinguish between seeming-based justification and correlated reflective 
justification. The deductive arguments licensed by (PC) are meant to convey –– specifically –– 
seeming-based justification, rather than reflective justification. If phenomenal conservatives drew 
this distinction and held these two types of justification apart, they could untangle the apparently 
conflicting intuitions that a cursory analysis of these arguments tends to produce. In this way, they 
could rebut the easy justification from closure objection. Let me show how to do this.
Suppose a subject S has a seeming that R and no defeater. Thanks to (PC), S has justification
for believing R based on that seeming. The thesis that if S realizes that R entails ¬SH, S’s 
justification based on her seeming that R can transmit to ¬SH appears to be straightforward, despite
Cohen’s opinion. As said, an asserted problem of this thesis is that transmitting justification in this 
way seems viciously circular. For, in this way, S’s seeming that R would provide S with justification
for believing that the seeming that R itself is not deceptive, which appears impossible. Under closer 
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scrutiny, however, this claim proves false. Recall that seeming-based justification is elusive 
because it “vanishes” as the subject becomes reflectively aware of the relevant seeming. 
Accordingly, when S has justification for R based on her seeming that R, S cannot be reflectively 
aware of her seeming. Now, suppose that S’s justification based on her seeming that R transmits to 
¬SH. Since S is not aware of having the seeming that R, this justification cannot count for S as a 
reason for believing that the seeming that R itself (of which she is not aware) is not deceptive.18 On 
the other hand, if S became reflectively aware of her seeming, S would no longer have that seeming-
based justification. Thus, S would not have a reason for believing that her seeming that R is not 
deceptive based on that seeming only. In conclusion, this way to get justification for ¬SH doesn’t 
involve vicious circularity. S can acquire seeming-based justification for believing ¬SH without 
circularity through the entailment from R to ¬SH and, if S actually deduces ¬SH, S can acquire a 
seeming-based justified belief that ¬SH without circularity. Analogous considerations apply to any 
other similar deductive argument authorized by (PC). 
One might doubt that S could actually acquire seeming-based justification for believing 
¬SH via the argument from R to ¬SH. For one might suppose that S’s mere thinking of ¬SH would 
instantly turn S’s attention to her seeming that R, which would wipe out her seeming-based 
justification for the premise. But this is false. Whether S’s thinking of ¬SH would make S’s 
reflectively aware of her seeming that R depends on the specific circumstances. Here is an example 
of a situation in which S’s thinking of ¬SH would probably not make S’s reflectively aware of her 
seeming that R. Note first that ¬SH is equivalent to the disjunction:
18 Also note that ¬SH doesn’t entail the proposition that S has a seeming that R. So, S’s believing ¬SH wouldn’t 
involve S’s believing that she has that seeming.
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(A) It is not the case that the table is white or (B) it is not the case that the table seems
red because it is illuminated by a hidden red light.19
Note that R entails ¬SH just because R entails A. The content of B is irrelevant; the entailment 
would hold true even if B were a random proposition. Now imagine that S takes an introductory 
course to logic. S happens to justifiedly believe R on the basis of her seeming that R. To practise 
logical connectives, S is asked by the teacher to deduce from R various disjunctions each of which 
including one random disjunct. To do this, S keeps the disjunct A fixed and forms the other disjunct 
of the disjunctions by picking out in sequence the members of a list of random propositions 
provided by the teacher. The list happens to include B. At a certain point S deduces ¬SH. Since S 
justifiedly believes R, S justifiedly believes ¬SH too. Nevertheless, given the circumstances (S is 
doing logic rather than, say, epistemology) and S’s peculiar way to put together ¬SH, it is plausible 
that S’s thinking of ¬SH and deducing it from R won’t lead S to introspect herself and become 
aware of her seeming that R.
Another asserted difficulty of arguments like the one from R to ¬SH, licensed by (PC), is 
that they generate a puzzle. If these deductive arguments are epistemically impeccable, why do 
people resort to inductive evidence or make independent checks, rather than simply running the 
arguments, to dispel concerns about the reliability of their appearances? But this puzzle can easily 
be unravelled. Note that when one is concerned about the accuracy of an appearance that one 
entertains, one is reflectively aware of it. Take then the argument from R to ¬SH enabled by (PC). 
When S is concerned about the accuracy of her seeming that R, and so S is reflectively aware of it, 
the basis of her justification for R is, not her seeming that R, but her reflective belief that she has 
that seeming. This explains why, when S is concerned about the accuracy of her seeming that R, S 
19 Since ¬ (X & Y) is equivalent to ¬X or ¬Y.
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cannot use the argument from R to ¬SH, licensed by (PC), to justifiedly conclude that ¬SH.
There is more. S can have justification for R based on her reflective belief that she has a seeming 
that R only if S has already justification for ¬SH –– namely, inductive justification from similar 
past cases or justification based on an independent check of ¬SH. This clarifies why, when S is 
concerned about the accuracy of her seeming that R because she suspects that SH might be true, S 
will look for inductive justification for ¬SH or will make an independent check of it. Analogous 
considerations apply to any deductive argument licensed by (PC) similar to the one from R to ¬SH. 
Thus, it is not puzzling, after all, that people resort to inductive evidence or independent checks 
when they worry about the accuracy of their appearances, rather than running these arguments.
We are now in a position to provide an accurate interpretation of Cohen’s thought 
experiments. Recall that in the first though experiment, Cohen’s son doubts ¬SH, but he is not 
persuaded by his father’s argument to believe ¬SH. The father argues that since it appears that R, R 
is true, therefore, ¬SH is also true. In the second thought experiment, the boy doesn’t doubt ¬SH. 
He only wants to know how his father knows that ¬SH. His father runs the same argument as 
before, which the son finds again unconvincing. My diagnosis of why this argument isn’t persuasive
in these scenarios will complete my response to the easy justification by closure objection. 
Let’s start with the first scenario. Since the boy doubts the accuracy of his seeming that R at 
the outset, he is reflectively aware of his seeming, and thus he justifiedly believes the proposition 
that he has a seeming that R. This belief constitutes the basis of his justification for R. When his 
father claims that since it appears that R, then R is true, the boy assesses this claim. Specifically, the
boy evaluates whether the proposition that he himself has an appearance that R is a good reason to 
believe R. To boy realizes that this proposition could actually be such a good reason only if he 
already had a good reason to believe ¬SH. The boy then assesses the father’s second claim that 
since R is true, then ¬SH is true. The boy realizes that he cannot come to have a good reason to 
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believe ¬SH in this way. For he must have a good reason to believe ¬SH in the first place to
carry out the reasoning. That’s why the boy finds his father’s argument unpersuasive. This thought 
experiment says nothing about the argument from R to ¬SH licensed by (PC). For the argument that
the boy doesn’t find persuasive is not one licensed by (PC). 
Pryor and Markie’s analysis of this case is partly misguided. Pryor and Markie claim that 
since the boy doubts ¬SH, he cannot accept his own appearance that R as a justification for R. I 
agree with them on this.20 This is an additional reason why the boy may find his father’s argument 
unconvincing. Yet Pryor and Markie also think that the boy, in this scenario, does possess 
justification for believing R because he has a seeming that R and no defeating evidence. They also 
think that the boy’s justification for R transmits to ¬SH across the entailment. Both claims are 
problematic. Concerning the first, my view is that the boy can have justification for believing R if 
he has independent (and stronger) justification for believing ¬SH. However, the basis of the boy’s 
justification is, in this case, his reflective belief that he has the seeming, not the seeming itself. The 
second claim is false: the boy’s reflective justification for R doesn’t transmit to ¬SH.
Let’s turn to Cohen’s second thought experiment. In this case, the boy has thought of the 
possibility that his seeming that R is deceptive –– so he is reflectively aware of it –– but he has 
ruled out this possibility because he thinks that his father knows that ¬SH. When the father explains
to him how one can conclude that ¬SH by adducing the argument described before, the boy finds it 
unconvincing. The explanation is identical to the one detailed before.
To conclude, phenomenal conservatism is not endangered by the problem of easy 
justification from closure. Under close scrutiny, the asserted difficulties dissolve.
20 If the boy has independent justification for ¬SH, but doubts ¬SH, he cannot take the proposition that he has an 
appearance that R to be a justification for R.
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5.5 Answering the easy justification from bootstrapping objection
Supporters of (PC) and similar principles of immediate justification almost generally acknowledge 
that bootstrapping arguments, such as (1)-(6) described in §5.3, are epistemically defective.21 These 
authors typically respond to the bootstrapping objection by insisting that if a subject S endorses 
(PC) or a similar principle, S is not committed by this very fact to accept the illicit step of the 
bootstrapping reasoning, which is almost always identified with the non-deductive one. This step 
would in fact be biased or defeated, as it would conflict with key methodological principles. 
Solutions of this type are for instance developed in Cohen (2002, 2005), Vogel (2008) and 
Weisberg (2010).22 (See Weisberg 2012 for a survey of internalist and externalist responses to the 
bootstrapping problem.) 
Let’s consider an example. Take again the bootstrapping argument (1)-(6). Its non-
deductive step is the one carried out by S from
(5) My colour experiences have always matched the actual colour of each of the n cards 
that I have viewed
to
(6) My colour vision is reliable.
21 Markie (2005) nevertheless denies it and contents that bootstrapping reasoning is only dialectically ineffective. See 
Cohen (2005)’s response.
22 Weisberg interprets the bootstrapping problem as a general paradox. See note 10 above.
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Vogel (2008) contends that the inference from (5) to (6) gets defeated because the whole
reasoning (1)-(6) is rule-circular. Rule-circular reasoning uses a rule R to establish that R itself is 
reliable. In particular, the defeater is the following proposition, which Vogel thinks to be a priori 
true:
(NRC) A belief that an epistemic rule R is reliable cannot be justified by the application of 
R. That is, neither the conclusion itself nor any belief which supports the conclusion 
may be justified in virtue of the application of R. (531)23
  Recall the initial steps of the bootstrapping argument:
(1) The first card appears red to me.
(2) The first card is red.
(3) The first card is red and appears red to me.
(4) Therefore, my colour appearance matches the actual colour of the card on this occasion.
 
We can think of (PC) as sanctioning a rule Rc, which states that if it appears to one that X has colour
C, and one has no reason to doubt it, then one ought to believe that X has colour C. (6) can be read 
as asserting that Rc is reliable. Furthermore, note that S uses Rc to justifiedly believe (2) in the 
thought experiment. Since S’s reasoning (1)-(6) comes in conflict with (NRC) at its non-deductive 
step from (6) to (7), this step is defeated and cannot give S justification for believing (7).
In short, Vogel (2008)’s response to the bootstrapping objection is the following: since 
(NRC) is a defeater of the non-deductive inference from (6) to (7), and (PC) is compatible with 
23 (NRC) is reminiscent of what Bergman (2000) calls the no self-support principle. Bergman interprets Fumerton 
(1995: 177) as endorsing it. 
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(NRC), supporters of (PC) are as such uncommitted to the non-deductive inference. So (PC) is
not hit by the easy justification from bootstrapping objection.
As White (2006) has emphasized, however, not all rule-circular reasoning is bad. For 
instance, ‘doing well in a memory game can suggest that I have a good memory, even though I 
can’t help but use my memory to evaluate my performance’ (530). But (NRC) would disallow this 
kind of reasoning. A problem of Vogel’s view is that it doesn’t distinguish between good and bad 
rule-circular reasoning. Weisberg (2010) has also found out that there are (impermissible) 
bootstrapping cases that don’t instantiate rule-circularity, so they cannot be stopped by (NRC).24
A cursory examination of the principal responses to the bootstrapping objection discussed in
the literature will show that they are all problematic to some degree. I cannot exclude that new 
proposals might turn out to be more straightforward.25 Nonetheless, my view is that phenomenal 
conservatism doesn’t need any sophisticated defence of this type. The reason being that since 
seeming-based justification is elusive, the bootstrapping objection cannot get off the ground when 
directed to perceptual dogmatism. Consider again the argument (1)-(6). Note that S can justifiedly 
believe that
(1) The first card appears red to me
only if S is reflectively aware of her seeming that the card is red. Accordingly, if S also justifiedly 
believes that
(2) The first card is red,
this justification cannot be based on S’s seeming that the card is red. S’s justification for (2), if any,
must be reflective justification –– that is to say, justification based on S’s reflective belief that she 
has that seeming. Therefore, (PC) is off the hook at the outset. 
24 See Cohen (2010) for further objections.
25 An interesting one is Butzer (2017).
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5.6 Conclusions
I have investigated the epistemological consequences of the fact that seeming-based justification is 
elusive, in the sense that a subject S can lose this justification simply by reflecting on her seemings 
and becoming aware of them. I have argued that because of this feature of seeming-based 
justification, S couldn’t successfully appeal to (PC) to reject sceptical arguments that questioned her
possessing seeming-based justification. I have also suggested that S’s seemings could not provide S 
with immediate justification for ruling out sceptical conjectures. These findings indicate that 
phenomenal conservatism doesn’t give scepticism a fully satisfactory response. On the positive side
of my investigation, I have shown that since seeming-based justification is elusive, phenomenal 
conservatism is not afflicted by easy justification problems. When seeming-based justification and 
reflective justification are held apart, it becomes apparent that neither the easy justification from 
closure objection nor the easy justification from bootstrapping objection strike phenomenal 
conservatism.
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